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Constitutional History of Ohio Appellate Courts
Judge Lee E. SkeeL*
[Editor's Note: This article is printed by permission of William Edward
Baldwin, D.C.L., and Banks Baldwin Co., who are about to publish a
Practice Manual On Appellate Procedure by Judge Lee E. Skeel, of which
this is the introductory chapter.]
T HE RIGHT OF APPEAL, using the word appeal in the broad
sense now given it in the Appellate Procedure Act of Ohio,
contemplates the removal of a case after judgment or final order,
from a court of inferior jurisdiction to a court of higher juris-
diction, in the judicial process for retrial or review. This right
is one that can be created only by the Constitution, or by statute
within constitutional limitations. Such a right contemplates a
retrial of the issues in some cases and, in other cases, a review
of the record of the proceedings of the trial court or of the re-
viewing court of lesser jurisdiction. The right to seek a second
trial, or a review of the trial, today is recognized as a desirable
part of the judicial process. It can be misused, and in the past
sometimes has been overextended. An editorial in the London
Law Journal in the early 1930's said:
"Shall we see something done to check the burden of appeals
which has been heavier under the Judicature Acts than ever
before. The modern practice of successive appeals, it has
been said, introduces the gambling element, and debars
prudent men from embarking in litigation. What a suitor
wants is to get a decision of the court, not to be the 'corpus
vile' for the judicial making of law."
At the outset, let it be said that appeal, particularly on
questions of law, is not the procedure intended to be depended
on in the first instance to win a lawsuit. Appellate courts were
provided in order to protect against trial court mistakes which
result in substantial prejudice, or in the denial of justice to one
seeking to enforce his legal rights in the courts. Nor should
appeals be used to delay the promptness of justice which is
legally due to another.
The case law of Ohio, on the subject of appeals, can only be
understood by first giving consideration to the historical back-
ground of the several court systems of the State.
* Of the Ohio Court of Appeals; President of Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; etc.
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The first Constitution of Ohio was adopted in 1802. This was
just before Ohio was admitted to statehood. By this Constitu-
tion, the judicial powers of the State, "both as to matters of law
and equity," were vested in the Supreme Court, Courts of Com-
mon Pleas, Justices of the Peace, and such other courts as the
legislature might establish. The Supreme Court, then consisting
of three judges, two of whom constituted a quorum, had original
and appellate jurisdiction both "in common law and in chancery,"
and exclusive jurisdiction in the trial of divorce, alimony and
capital cases. It was obliged to hold one term in each county of
the State. The Court of Common Pleas was a court of general
jurisdiction in law and equity (including the trial of criminal
cases, probate and guardianship matters). It was limited only
by matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and also such as were within the exclusive limited juris-
diction of justices of the peace. It held court in the several
counties within defined subdivisions bounded by county lines.
The judges (three in number in each county) were laymen, ex-
cept for the president of the district or subdivision. The only
retrial or review provided for was to the Supreme Court of the
county. Under such a system of court organization, conflicts in
legal principles announced in the trial of cases in the several
counties were not subject to review by a court of general superior
jurisdiction. And there being no requirement for the filing of
opinions by the reviewing court, the progress and development
of the common law of Ohio were slow and difficult.
In 1808, a fourth judge was added to the Supreme Court, the
State was divided into two districts, and two judges were assigned
to travel the circuit in each district; that is, to hold a session of
court in each county within the district at least once a year.
In 1823 an Act was passed requiring the Supreme Court
(then composed, as above stated, of four members) to meet once
a year in Columbus after the close of their tour of. the circuits,
and to consult together upon, and decide, conflicts and questions
of law reserved to the Supreme Court from the counties. The
Supreme Court was then required to appoint a reporter to re-
port all such decisions. This was the beginning of the twenty
volumes of "Ohio Reports," which contain the decisions of the
Supreme Court "in banc" from 1823 to 1851. In 1851 the court
system of Ohio was changed by the adoption of the Constitution
of 1851.
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During the period 1831 to 1836, some of the decisions of the
Supreme Court, while on circuit, were reported in "Wright's
Report." With that exception, and with the exception of a few
such cases in Volume 1 of the Ohio Reports, the decisions of the
Supreme Court, while on circuit, have never been reported.
The Constitution of 1851 (adopted effective September 1,
1851), vested the judicial powers of the State in the Supreme
Court, District Courts, Common Pleas Courts, Probate Courts,
and in Justices of the Peace and such other courts inferior to
the Supreme Court as might be established from time to time by
the legislature. Under this last provision, the legislature, at dif-
ferent times, created the Superior Court of Cincinnati and like
courts in Dayton and Cleveland, with jurisdictions comparable
(as trial courts) with that of the Court of Common Pleas. The
Cincinnati Superior Court, established after the adoption of the
Constitution of 1851, was composed of three judges, any one of
whom could try a case at special term and whose decisions could
be reviewed at general term by the judges in banc.
The Constitution of 1851 constituted a Supreme Court of
five judges and took away most of its original jurisdiction, except
for the special writs. It then became, in reality, the reviewing
court of last resort for the trial of cases on error and appeal. Its
opinions were required to be reported, and are now to be found
beginning with Vol. 1 of the official reports of the court, -desig-
nated "Ohio State Reports."
By the Constitution of 1851, the State of Ohio was divided
into nine judicial districts. These in turn were divided into
smaller subdivisions, for the purpose of election of judges of the
Common Pleas courts or such other trial courts of general original
jurisdiction as might be created by the legislature.
The District Court of each of the nine districts was com-
prised of one of the judges of the Supreme Court, and two Com-
mon Pleas judges of a district in which sessions were held. As
thus constituted, such district court was required to hold stated
sessions in at least three places within each of the districts each
year. It was an appellate court, its jurisdiction being defined as
the same as that of the Supreme Court. But of course its place
in the judicial system was inferior to that of the Supreme Court.
This was the first attempt in Ohio to create an intermediate re-
viewing court, albeit its members were taken in part from the
court where the trial was had and in part from the court to
which the final appeal could be taken.
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The Supreme Court, under such a system, where the session
in banc in Columbus was followed by a long tour on the circuit,
required judges to have not only profound knowledge of the
law but also great physical stamina to withstand the hardships
of travel of that day. An overcrowded condition of the docket
also was being caused by increase in litigation as the State's in-
dustry grew, and by the fact that the then-judicial-process was
geared to a sparsely-settled rural civilization, out of keeping with
the rapid development of the State and its increasing population.
After the 1851 changes, by a constitutional amendment
adopted October 12, 1875, it was provided that, by a two-thirds
vote of the General Assembly, at the request of the Supreme
Court, a Judicial Commission of five members could be appointed
by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, vested
with like jurisdiction as the Supreme Court, to dispose of such
part of the docket of the Supreme Court "as the Court shall
designate." This provision of the Constitution is still in force as
Section 22 of Article IV of the Constitution. Only two such com-
missions have ever been appointed, one for three years begin-
ning in 1876, and the other appointed in 1883 for a two year
period.
The failure of the District Court to meet the needs of inter-
mediate retrial and review, or to relieve the Supreme Court of
the heavy burden imposed upon it (in addition to sitting in banc
in Columbus) by one of its members being required to attend
the trial of cases in each of the district courts when sitting in the
several counties, may be, in part, ascribed to the breadth of its
jurisdiction. In March, 1852, its jurisdiction was as follows, as
defined by statute:
"Appeals may be taken from all final judgments in civil cases
at law, decrees in chancery and interlocutory decrees dis-
solving injunctions rendered by the court of common pleas,
the superior and commercial courts of Cincinnati and the
superior court of Cleveland, in which said courts have origi-
nal jurisdiction by any party against whom such judgment
or decree shall be rendered or who may be affected thereby,
to the district court and, the cause so appealed shall be
again tried, heard and decided in the district court in the
same manner as though said district court had original juris-
diction of the cause."
Thus retrials of law cases by jury, as well as retrials to the
court in equity, were available to dissatisfied litigants until 1853;
then, by statute, a retrial of issues of fact was limited to cases
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where the parties were not entitled to jury trial. But this was
not all. After retrial or review, either party could again appeal
to the Supreme Court of the county, with the right in some
cases to a hearing before the Supreme Court when sitting in banc
in Columbus.
By the constitutional amendment of 1883 the judicial section
(Art. IV), dealing with the court systems of the state, was amend-
ed, doing away with "District Courts" and establishing a new
court to be known as the "Circuit Court" in its place. This was
the first time that an intermediate appellate or reviewing court,
presided over by judges elected to serve on that court, was
authorized by the Constitution of Ohio. The State was to be
divided into circuits (at first 7 and then 8), in each of which
circuits three judges were to be elected. The Circuit Courts
were required by law to hold at least two sessions in each county
of the district each year.
The constitutional amendment of 1883 also provided that the
Supreme Court should consist of five judges. That court's origi-
nal jurisdiction thereupon was in quo warranto, mandamus,
habeas corpus and procedendo, and it was to possess such appel-
late jurisdiction as might be provided by law.
The Circuit Court's jurisdiction was the same as the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with regard to the extraordi-
nary writs. It was also given such appellate jurisdiction as might
be provided by law. Section 5226 of the Revised Statutes stated
that, in addition to special cases providing for appeal (trial de
novo; one of such special instances being in divorce cases), the
Circuit Court's appeals could be taken from those judgments or
final orders of the Common Pleas Court of which it had original
jurisdiction, where the right to demand a trial of the facts by
jury did not exist. Section 6709 of the Revised Statutes provided
for error proceedings from final orders or judgments of the Com-
mon Pleas Court for errors appearing on the face of the record.
This right was obtained by filing a petition in error in the re-
viewing court. Section 6710 of the Revised Statutes provided for
like error proceedings from the Circuit Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. No limitation on the right to petition the Su-
preme Court for review was placed on the litigant, other than
the need to act within the terms of the Supreme Court's juris-
diction, as thus defined.
The Circuit Court, subject to almost complete legislative
control, only partly fulfilled the objectives of the legislature and
of the constitutional convention in creating it. Instead of reliev-
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ing the Supreme Court of at least a part of its heavy docket, it in
fact increased the number of cases filed in that court. It did,
however, relieve the judges of the Supreme Court from circuit
duty. And the Supreme Court Commissions, heretofore spoken
of, helped to take care of the accumulation of pending cases.
The 1912 constitutional amendments to Article IV took the
respective jurisdictions of the reviewing courts almost com-
pletely out of the control of the legislature. The Supreme Court
was given original jurisdiction in the special writs as before;
also, certain revisory jurisdiction over administrative agencies
as provided by law; the obligation to review judgments of the
Courts of Appeals, where cases were filed in a Court of Appeals
and thus invoked its original jurisdiction; appeals as of right
which in fact involve constitutional questions necessary to a
decision of the case; appeals in cases certified to it by a Court of
Appeals, wherein the judgment of the Court of Appeals was in
conflict with the judgment of another Court of Appeals; appeals
in felony cases, upon leave being granted by the Supreme Court;
and appeals in cases of public or great general interest, where
the Supreme Court granted a litigant's motion directing a Court
of Appeals to certify its record of the case to the Supreme Court
for review on questions of law.
The Court of Appeals, which was created to succeed the
Circuit Court, by this amendment was granted original jurisdic-
tion with regard to the same writs in like manner as the Supreme
Court; appellate jurisdiction, on questions of law, from final
orders or judgments of courts of record; and the duty to try
issues of fact in chancery cases in appeals on questions of law
and fact. The result of these amendments was to make the
dourt of Appeals the court of last resort in all cases where the
litigants could not appeal as a matter of right to the Supreme
Court; for example, where leave was refused in criminal cases
and the case was not certified to the Supreme Court for review
as a conflict case by the Court of Appeals, and where the Su-
preme Court overruled a motion to require the Court of Appeals
to certify its record as provided by the Constitution.
The last amendment to Article IV, dealing with reviewing
courts, occurred in 1944. Under this amendment, the legislature
was again given some control over the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was not
changed. The Constitution, as amended, provided that in addi-
tion to its original jurisdiction in the extraordinary writs, the
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Court of Appeals should have "such jurisdiction as provided by
law to review, affirm, modify, set aside or reverse judgments or
final orders of boards, commissions, officers or tribunals and of
courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the dis-
trict and judgments of the court of appeals shall be final in all
cases, except cases involving questions arising under the Con-
stitution of the United States, or of this State, cases of felony,
cases of which it has original jurisdiction and cases of public or
great general interest in which the Supreme Court may direct
any court of appeals to certify its record to that court."
This amendment left uncertain the jurisdiction of the Courts
of Appeal to try cases de novo, on both law and facts (i.e., in
equity cases). The Supreme Court, however, reaffirmed the
Courts of Appeals' prior-existing powers to retry such cases.
(Youngstown Mun. Ry. Co. v. Youngstown, 147 0. S. 221; Dec.
1946.) Even so, clarifying legislation pursuant to the constitu-
tional amendment was desired, and was enacted a few years
later.
The legislature, under the authority of the 1944 amendment,
passed Section 2501.02 of the Revised Code (effective October 4,
1955), defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal.
This section provides for review of prejudicial error "committed
by such lower court on appeals on questions of law and on ap-
peals on questions of law and fact," the Court of Appeals being
authorized to "weigh the evidence" in the retrial of the ten
classes of actions enumerated in the section, if "a primary and
paramount relief" claimed by the appellant comes within the
causes enumerated in such "classes of actions." (The actions
enumerated are clearly cases in chancery.)
It is plain to see, from the foregoing history of the constitu-
tional and statutory provisions dealing with retrial and appellate
review in judicial proceedings, that a main objective has been to
provide for one trial, and for the opportunity of one review, in
matters requiring judicial consideration or determination of dis-
puted questions of fact and the law applicable thereto. That
this objective has never been attained must be admitted. In
fact there seems to be a growing trend in Ohio to create new
courts to try cases of so-called "lesser magnitude," in order to
deal with the ever-growing number of cases fied in our courts.
But there is no such thing as an unimportant judicial determina-
tion of a disputed question of fact and law. The faith of the
people in their courts depends on the average results of cases
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squaring with what is generally considered just and fair. Courts
cannot attain the exactitude of the provable sciences. But an
honest judgment, fairly and impartially pronounced after an
adequate investigation of the facts, in a tribunal presided over
by one trained in the law and with adequate provision for a re-
view in order to see to it that the accepted law has been afforded
to the parties, is the means by which justice serves the best in-
terests of the people.
A reviewing court likewise is important in order to coordi-
nate divergent legal contentions, and to establish principles and
precedents to guide the course of future cases dealing with like
subjects.
Appeal thus is seen to be desirable for two principal rea-
sons: first, to test the correctness of the proceeding, when a
litigant feels that he has not been afforded justice under the
law; and, second, to record and give sanction to correct rules of
law as they conform to changing conditions. "Without some
central review, the divergent opinions of numerous trial courts
would become confusion compounded."
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